The German elections and those of other European nations have recently highlighted a trend: classic liberal parties are finding it increasingly difficult to find space in a political landscape polarised between forces close to Putinism and supporters of a strong Europeanism. This opposition, which affects not only foreign policy choices but also the very idea of democracy and continental integration, is pushing citizens towards options perceived as ‘clearer’ or ‘stronger’, crushing the positions in between. But what is the origin of this crisis of classical liberalism? And what are the prospects for the future of liberals in Europe?

A growing polarisation

In many EU countries, political opposition tends to be structured around a binary choice: on the one hand, those who strongly support European integration and imagine a more cohesive Union; on the other hand, those who would like to recover elements of national sovereignty, sometimes going so far as to question the pillars of the European project. The latter view, in several cases, is also fuelled or encouraged by Vladimir Putin’s regime, which for years has been conducting a strategy of influence and destabilisation in the internal politics of EU countries.

Within this framework, the classical liberal parties struggle to distinguish themselves. Although they are by definition part of the pro-European front, they seem less attractive than forces with more direct messages, appealing to emotions. Both in the pro-European camp (where pragmatist or more popular views prevail) and in the nationalist camp (sometimes hostile to the EU), liberals risk becoming marginalised, perceived as too technocratic or elitist.

The case of Germany

Germany offers a paradigmatic example of this process. There, voters rewarded parties that offered clear-cut answers: on the one hand, the CDU/CSU in a pro-European and moderate key; on the other, the AfD, riding on discontent with the Union. The FDP liberals, although traditionally recognised for their competence and seriousness on economic issues, have seen their electoral weight reduced. Victims of a ‘useful vote’ logic and associated with a government judged to be unpopular, their economic and institutional liberalism appears little incisive in a climate fraught with tensions.

A look at Europe

Germany, however, is not an isolated case. Several countries on the continent show the same dynamic. The liberal parties, often united in the Renew Europe group in the European Parliament, are in crisis or in sharp decline:

• France: Renaissance, the party founded by Emmanuel Macron, has suffered a sharp drop in support in the 2024 legislative elections. Crushed between a compact left-wing front and the right-wing of Marine Le Pen, Macron’s centrist liberalism is struggling to maintain its role as the needle of the scales.
• Italy: The liberal centre is fragmented into small forces, crushed by electoral systems that make it difficult or at least inconsistent for them to join the major pre-electoral coalitions, and victims of the useful vote induced by these systems.
• Netherlands: D66, a historically strong liberal and strongly pro-European force, has lost appeal compared to the past, due to the growth of more radical or more identity-focused formations.
• Spain: Ciudadanos, which a few years ago seemed destined to contend for supremacy with the Socialists and Populars, has all but disappeared from the political scene. The polarisation between PSOE and PP (with the addition of regionalist forces and the extreme right of Vox) leaves little room for a centrist area.
• Poland and Hungary: here, more than ever, the liberal option is marginal. The political debate focuses on the clash with Brussels over civil rights and the rule of law, while the electorate seeks parties that can guarantee ‘protection’ rather than further European integration.

The reasons for marginalisation

Several common factors can be identified behind this trend:

1. Erosion of the political centre: polarisation pushes voters towards more marked positions that promise immediate answers to concrete problems (immigration, economic crisis, social change). Liberals, placed on middle ground, appear less able to arouse the enthusiasm of an increasingly anxious segment of the electorate.
2. Crisis of the liberal economic model: the consequences of globalisation, energy crises and post-pandemic inflation have eroded confidence in the idea of a free market producing widespread prosperity. In Germany, the FDP paid the price for a struggling economy, failing to convince that it had the right recipe for revitalisation.
3. Europeanism under pressure: although in some countries pro-EU forces maintain high support, the idea of a ‘pure’ and technocratic Europeanism struggles to convince those who call for more protective social and economic policies. Parties such as the CDU/CSU in Germany or the Populars in other countries manage to decline Europeanism in a less abstract key, absorbing part of the liberal electorate.
4. Competition within the pro-European area: the Greens, with their strong push on environmental and social issues, and the moderate centre-right forces are eroding support for the Liberals. The latter struggle to come up with a distinctive message that goes beyond the defence of integration and traditional liberal values.

The implications for European democracy

The retreat of the classical liberal parties may have profound effects on the functioning of European democracy. These parties have often played a ‘hinge’ role, promoting dialogue and moderation, both in government coalitions and in the European Parliament. Their weakness could result in further polarisation, impoverishing the debate of balanced and pragmatic voices. Moreover, the absence of a liberal counterweight could strengthen the frontal opposition between those who radically oppose the Union and those who defend it at all costs, making it more difficult to reach the compromises necessary for effective continental governance.

Possible paths to revitalisation

Although the signs are not encouraging, the fate of classical liberals is not inevitably sealed. Some actions could help reverse the trend:

1. Renewal of the message: Liberals need to decline their traditional values (individual liberty, free market, civil rights) by responding to the needs of the present, such as economic security, energy transition and migration management. It is crucial to speak clearly to citizens about real challenges, showing concrete solutions instead of recipes perceived as ideological.
2. Strategic alliances: forging agreements with other moderate political forces could help avoid irrelevance and better influence institutions. In a fragmented political system, alliances do not necessarily mean giving up one’s identity, but rather ensuring a greater ability to influence government choices.
3. More empathy and less technocracy: classical liberalism risks appearing detached if it fails to translate its ideas into tangible answers to everyday problems. Communicating with more empathy – without sacrificing rigour – can make liberal discourse more accessible and closer to the people.
4. Avoid over-identification with unpopular governments: as in the case of the FDP in Germany, being in government during critical phases can wear down consensus. It is necessary to be able to negotiate limits and priorities, while being able to show concrete results for the electorate.

Conclusions

Classical liberalism faces a complex challenge. On the one hand, the thrust of Putinism and sovereignist forces disintegrates the pro-European fabric. On the other, the pro-European camp itself is fragmenting between centre-right, social democratic, ecologist and progressive populist forces, which know how to intercept voters’ fears and aspirations in a more emotional way. For the Liberals, the stakes are high: the risk is not only irrelevance, but also the loss of an essential pillar of European political pluralism.

The good news is that a space still exists, especially on a continent that has historically made liberalism one of its key references. But to regain it, liberal parties must give up a certain abstract technicality and demonstrate the ability to address the urgencies of our time: economic crises, climate emergencies, migration and security. If they succeed in renewing themselves and proposing concrete solutions, they can once again become a point of balance in the European public debate, helping to temper polarisation and strengthen the quality of democracy. Otherwise, they risk being crushed in a confrontation where the one who shouts the loudest wins, and where the value of moderation – one of the historic cornerstones of the European project – risks fading into the background.