Supporting Ukraine is not just an act of solidarity or the expression of a moral principle. It is, first and foremost, a pragmatic, almost ‘selfish’ decision that responds to a clear security interest for Europe. For three years, the Ukrainian army has been engaged in an intense conflict against Russian forces and Moscow-backed separatists. In this modern warfare, which mixes conventional tactics, hybrid operations and cyber attacks, the Kyiv military has developed extraordinary expertise, learning how to use advanced technologies and procedures provided by NATO and integrating them with innovative strategies.

This first-hand experience on such a complex battlefield has turned Ukraine into a kind of ‘living laboratory’ of contemporary warfare. Unlike countries that have lived in peace for decades, Ukraine knows what it means to face, day in and day out, an enemy that is not limited to military force, but also exploits propaganda, economic pressure and energy intimidation. Supporting Kyiv therefore means preserving a valuable ally that is, in fact, shielding Europe, and having access to a wealth of practical lessons that are also useful for the defence of EU members. The use of drones, defence against cyber-attacks, the ability to react quickly to the manoeuvres of a powerful adversary: all this gives the Ukrainian armed forces a unique store of knowledge.

One of the most important aspects is the advanced use of drones: to give an example, Ukrainian soldiers use vehicles such as the Bayraktar TB2, which is equipped with laser targeting systems and MAM-L ammunition capable of neutralising armoured vehicles with very high precision. Coordination between drones and artillery has been perfected, which is crucial for locating targets and optimising field strikes. These techniques, still evolving within NATO, offer important lessons on how to integrate drones into conventional engagements.

On the electronic warfare front, Ukraine faced Russian jamming systems such as Krasukha-4, keeping networks operational through redundant communications and alternative frequencies. In an era of hybrid warfare, this demonstrates the importance of defending critical infrastructure and strategic networks. The same applies to the urban guerrilla tactics implemented during the battle of Mariupol, where regular troops and local militias displayed creative defence strategies, even using modified commercial drones.

Another pillar is the integration of NATO weapon systems, from Javelin anti-tank missiles to HIMARS rocket launchers with GMLRS ammunition, capable of hitting targets tens of kilometres away. Kyiv has also rapidly adopted Western standards for air defence, installing Patriot systems and coordinating them with innovative software such as Kropyva.

If all this expertise were destroyed or, worse, ended up in Russian hands, Moscow would get an army trained according to NATO procedures. Ukrainian soldiers and officers could be co-opted and forced to share secrets on ground tactics, drone use and command procedures. Russia, by analysing captured equipment, would quickly develop countermeasures to make it less effective in the future. It would also have access to the accumulated experience of countering its own artillery and Orlan-10 drones, whose dangerousness would be further refined by learning about Ukrainian findings of their vulnerabilities.

The idea of giving in to Putin’s demands and allowing Russia to turn Ukraine into a puppet state would therefore have far more serious consequences than a simple revision of the geographical borders. The entire Ukrainian ‘military capital’, forged by a real war and equipped with Western weapons and procedures, would end up in the hands of Moscow. An army experienced and armed according to NATO standards, but controlled by the Kremlin, would exponentially amplify the power of a Russia that has already manifested expansionist ambitions in several areas of the continent, from Georgia to the Baltic borders. A subjugated Ukraine would become a huge military platform, located close to the Eastern European states, ready to threaten regional security and further destabilise the continental geopolitical framework.

For Europe, preventing this from happening is a gesture of responsibility to itself. Regional stability, collective security and the defence of the eastern borders also depend on the ability to stem Russian expansionism. Supporting Ukraine serves to maintain a strategic embankment, while giving up the defence of Ukraine would mean giving Moscow a military and political advantage that, in the long run, could translate into far more concrete threats to the stability of many EU countries.

Ukraine’s right to self-determination and the preservation of democratic values remain the noblest aspects of the issue, but the EU’s immediate interest is also at stake. It is therefore not just a matter of empathy towards an aggrieved people, but of rationality: by defending Ukraine, Europe protects itself, protects its borders and preserves the possibility of drawing on a wealth of military expertise that, if lost or ended up in the service of Moscow, would risk overturning the balance of power on the continent.