Is it still news that, with the collapse of support for moderate parties, the wave of populism – fuelled by the distorted use of free speech on social media – has also swept through Austria, as it did in the elections of September 2024? No, it is no longer news. We have become accustomed to the disintegration of certainties that seemed granitic, only to discover that our welfare state rested on quicksand. For decades we have lain under the US military umbrella, the Russian energy umbrella and the Chinese trade umbrella. Now, with their neo-imperialist strategies, these three pillars are in open conflict with the West.

In contrast, the difficulty – or tenacity – in forming a new government in Vienna, which took office after 137 days of stalemate, more than twice the usual 65 days, is newsworthy. In Austria, the three moderate parties – conservatives, social democrats and liberals – fought to the last to avoid new elections after the resounding failure of the extreme right. Despite 28% of the vote and a bid for the chancellorship by the conservatives, the extreme right saw its goal slip away due to intransigence on positions irreconcilable with transatlantic and European values. A goal that their historic leader Jörg Haider had pursued, anticipating the European populists of today.

The outcome of the vote has confirmed a crucial truth: in Austria and Germany, trust in extremist forces has never shaken the moderate majority. This is why attempts were made to the last to form a government in extremis. As in Italy, where the President of the Republic guarantees institutional balance, the Austrian President also called the moderate forces to responsibility, restoring dignity to the word ‘compromise’. A term often debased by populists, but now rediscovered as a guarantee of stability in times of crisis.

The news, therefore, is no longer the political chaos, but the calmness of the institutional players. After weeks of speculation about a radical government, Austria soon found itself not with an extreme right-wing chancellor, but with a moderate three-party coalition, the first since 1947. Instead of giving in to the temptation of new elections – hoped for by the extremists, victorious at the polls but inexperienced in the management of power – the three parties signed a detailed coalition agreement of more than 200 pages, accepting the President’s call for a judicious use of words. Starting with the fundamental one: ‘compromise’. Without it, neither in the family nor in society can anything be built, let alone in the running of the state.

But the real news is that, in the aftermath of the agreement, the new Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister gave a concrete demonstration of what it means to govern with responsibility. Only 24 hours after being sworn in, they appeared together on a public television programme, politely and patiently answering questions from two of the country’s most feared journalists. If moderate forces still manage to form governments and transparently submit to public opinion, one wonders whether the health of our democracies is not measured precisely by the ability of the executive to openly confront the press, instead of taking refuge in propaganda on social media.

Maybe one day, even in Italy, the unseemly spectacle of journalists being forced to chase ministers and undersecretaries down the street for a statement, while they entrench themselves behind the mantra of‘Make an appointment via email with my staff‘, without the coveted confrontation ever happening, will come to an end. Tell me how you treat the press and I will tell you what idea of democracy or democratisation you have.

Of course, the room for manoeuvre of these governments, today in Vienna and soon in Berlin, is narrow. For some it is a fragile balance to be preserved, for others an inevitable paradigm shift. The risk is clear: if these moderate experiments fail, power could end up in the hands of ultra-populist forces.

Perhaps this is why, alongside the desire to revive the concept of compromise, there is a widespread sense of urgency, almost of fear. Time to act is limited, both in the face of internal and external challenges. However, there are no credible alternatives: new elections would mean chronic instability, as demonstrated by the case of Israel, where political paralysis only seems to be masked by a conflict that indiscriminately affects civilians. The moderate forces know this well: they must play this last card before the system finally collapses, turning into a game of chance with unpredictable outcomes.

In Germany, this awareness is palpable in both the chancellor in pectore, Friedrich Merz, and the Social Democratic leader Lars Klingbeil, now relegated to a subordinate role after his party’s electoral collapse. Although opposed to a new Große Koalition experiment, both seem resigned to the inevitable. Mindful of Germany’s long-standing immobility under Angela Merkel, they know that the grand coalition is a stopgap solution, not an ambitious political choice.

Yet their statements reveal an uncomfortable truth: it is not the desire to value compromise that drives this decision, but pressure from the extreme right, which in some quarters flirts with neo-Nazi-inspired positions. This is not a considered strategic choice, but a defensive move.

Berlin will have to learn that compromise and transparency are not signs of weakness, but essential tools to avoid political fragmentation. The wounds of the failed ‘traffic light’ coalition between the Greens, Social Democrats and Liberals are still open, yet the time of monolithic majorities is over. Today, 17 of the 27 EU member states are governed by multi-party coalitions: no longer the exception, but the rule.

Austria proves that coalitions can work even beyond the traditional conservative-social democrat duopoly. The inclusion of the Neos liberals, although not strictly necessary, has enriched the political debate and strengthened the legitimacy of the executive. More than numbers in Parliament, the real added value is the rediscovery of the culture of compromise.

In an era marked by Trumpism, where politics seems to be reduced to slogans and polarisation, this return to dialectical synthesis is not only a necessity, but a principle inherited from Athenian democracy. And, right here, in a Europe with a thousand-year-old memory, we should avoid disowning it too lightly.