9 May, you know, is Europe Day. But, as of yesterday, the date 9 February rivals the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration in historical importance: the Baltic Republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have officially disconnected from the Russian electricity grid, completing the long-awaited transition from Moscow’s energy sphere of influence to the European Union. This disconnection, accelerated by geopolitical tensions arising from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, has not been sufficiently emphasised by the mainstream European media. Yet, it represents a crucial geopolitical, economic and strategic achievement. It is not just a local success for the Baltic, but a real move towards energy independence for the whole of Europe. The disconnection from the Russian system marks a point of no return on the Union’s path to energy sovereignty, demonstrating that it is possible to break free from decades of infrastructural and political dependence on Moscow. The event strengthens the integration of the European electricity market, reduces vulnerabilities related to external supplies and increases the resilience of the continental system. But its significance goes beyond the technical dimension: it is a declaration of collective sovereignty.

A radically new geopolitical context

Let’s look at the details. The three Baltic nations, re-established as independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, remained connected to the Russian electricity grid for decades. Despite joining NATO and the EU in 2004, full autonomy from the Russian system proved complex and costly, as the grid had historically been designed around Soviet guidelines. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 gave a decisive acceleration to the disconnection projects, which were considered crucial for national security and regional stability.

The disconnection process: from BRELL to continental Europe

The technical transition formally began six months ago, when the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania notified Moscow that they were leaving the BRELL agreement. On 9 February 2025, after a 24-hour test run in island mode, the Baltic electricity systems were synchronised with the Continental Europe Synchronous Area, which brings together most EU countries.
In addition to its symbolic significance, integration with the European grid provides greater operational stability and protection against possible retaliation or interruptions from Russia.

Costs, benefits and growth prospects

The European Union has financed approximately EUR 1.2 billion for the construction of new transmission lines, including submarine cables connecting the Baltic Republics with Finland, Sweden and Poland. Nevertheless, each Baltic country has had to bear significant burdens: Lithuania, for example, has invested more than EUR 300 million in upgrades and internal infrastructure, while Latvia’s investment amounts to approximately EUR 483 million. In the short term, industry analysts estimate a 5% to 10% increase in energy prices for consumers, due to the need to stabilise the grid and cover transition costs. Some industries (chemical, metal) may also experience an increase in operating costs of around 7% in the first year post-disconnection.

On the opposite side, the detachment from Moscow offers structural advantages. Energy diversification and the development of renewables represent a significant opportunity: Estonia, a regional leader in offshore wind power, could increase its green energy production by 30 per cent by 2030, according to a study by Tallinn University. In addition,energy autonomy and increased security of supply make the Baltic States more attractive for international investment, particularly for high-tech companies that require stability and reliability in energy networks. In addition, the reduction of geopolitical risk is a crucial benefit: the switch to the European grid significantly decreases the danger of ‘energy shocks’ related to disruptions or blackmail by Russia, strengthening the overall resilience of the system.

Moscow’s threats are not over

The transition to a fully integrated electricity system with the European Union, while eliminating dependence on the Russian grid, exposes the Baltic Republics and thus the whole of Europe to a different kind of risk.

Indeed, Moscow may be using sabotage tactics aimed at critical infrastructure – not only energy infrastructure, but also communication and data transmission infrastructure. Since October 2023, at least eleven submarine cables in the Baltic Sea have been damaged, including the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland, communication cables connecting Finland, Germany, Sweden and Lithuania, and even power lines such as Estlink 2 between Estonia and Finland. The most recent incident involved a data cable between Latvia and Sweden on 26 January. Initial investigations revealed that many of these failures were caused by ships intentionally dragging anchors on the seabed, often associated with Russia’s so-called ‘shadow fleet‘ of oil tankers.

The Baltic and Scandinavian authorities suspect a real sabotage plan, triggered by Russia in the broader context of geopolitical tensions with the West. It is no coincidence that Lithuania has already increased its military presence to protect its submarine energy infrastructure, after an attempt to damage the NordBalt line that connects the country to Sweden. At the Atlantic Alliance level, the response was not long in coming: NATO launched the Baltic Sentry mission, increasing patrols and naval equipment, such as drones and frigates, in the Baltic Sea area. It also established a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network with the aim of improving information exchange and surveillance, and a Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure at the Maritime Command in Northwood, UK.

In addition to submarine cables, overland connections also need to be protected, as demonstrated by the focus on the LitPol Link, the main overland electricity interconnection between Lithuania and Poland and a strategic artery for synchronising the Baltic countries with the European continental network. Lithuania has strengthened the security of this corridor by replacing the private company in charge with its own Public Security Service, while further protection measures are being discussed, including the request for European funds for the defence of critical infrastructure.

In addition, the Suwalki Corridor, the strip of land separating the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad from Belarus, is viewed with apprehension. An eventual closure or blockade of this strip of land could physically isolate the Baltics from the rest of Europe, with consequences not only for the power grid, but also for transport and military lines – just think of the Rail Baltica project, which is crucial for civil mobility and military logistics. This is where the coordinated action of the Baltic States, Poland and NATO is concentrated, including through an increased military presence and the creation of a Baltic Defence Line along the borders with Russia (including Kaliningrad) and Belarus.

In essence, while the energy autonomy of the Baltic Republics and their synchronisation with the EU grid shift the focus away from dependence on Russian supplies, the focus is now on the defence of key infrastructure. To prevent hostile actions from wiping out the progress made, local authorities and international partners are multiplying their efforts: from naval patrols to cable protection and military reinforcement at the most vulnerable points. In this scenario, the Baltics’ ‘move for energy independence’ is inevitably intertwined with the security and stability of the whole of Europe.

“These incidents show that, in a context of hybrid warfare, the defence of critical infrastructure is crucial. Europe must react in a united way, with advanced technological solutions and an effective deterrence policy.”

Dalia Grybauskaitė, former Lithuanian President and active in the field of energy security

The repercussions on the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad

The Baltic disconnect has direct repercussions on the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, nestled between Lithuania and Poland, both members of the EU and NATO. Energy isolation is one of the main challenges for the region: Kaliningrad, which once benefited from a connection to the Russian system via Lithuania, now finds itself relying on three power plants (Kaliningradskaya, Pregolskaya and Talajovskaya) based mainly on gas. These facilities may not be sufficient in case of peak demand or sudden crises, making the region vulnerable to power supply disruptions.

Added to this are geopolitical tensions, as Russia has historically responded to such ‘pressures’ by increasing the militarisation of the area, which already hosts strategic installations and short-range missiles. Energy isolation could therefore fuel new frictions with the West, prompting Moscow to take defensive or aggressive measures to strengthen its military presence in the region.

Finally, there are important economic consequences. Rising energy costs, coupled with logistical difficulties in transporting goods across EU territory, accentuate Kaliningrad’s economic isolation. These difficulties threaten to cause a drop in investment and reduced competitiveness in industrial sectors, further aggravating the exclave’s fragile economic situation.

This situation could open a rift in civil society in Kaliningrad, where aspirations for greater freedom have emerged over the years, fuelling independence movements such as the Baltic Republican Party, founded in 1993 with the aim of creating an autonomous republic in the region. Although the party was dissolved in 2005, autonomist sentiments persist, supported by groups such as the Kaliningrad Public Movement – Respublika. Energy isolation and the resulting economic difficulties could strengthen these movements, increasing tensions with Moscow.

The open challenge: designing and strengthening energy independence

The disconnection of the Baltic Republics from the Russian electricity system marks a step of historic significance. Geopolitically, it marks the final exit of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from post-Soviet influence, in a context of growing tensions with Moscow. Economically, it entails short-term costs and industrial challenges, but offers great development opportunities in the long run, including renewable energy and investment attraction. For European security, it reduces Russian leverage over the EU’s energy supply, but at the same time raises new concerns about possible hybrid sabotage.

While in the squares of Vilnius, Tallinn and Riga the new energy course is being celebrated, it is our duty as pro-Europeans to follow developments closely, aware that this event represents a fundamental step towards greater autonomy and security for the entire continent. The way towards a fully integrated, resilient and energy-independent Europe is mapped out: the challenge now is to protect and strengthen it.