China is taking decisive steps in its military preparedness, and defence analysts around the world are watching closely. The latest news – according to the specialist website Naval News – concerns the construction in Chinese shipyards of a fleet of special amphibious barges, ostensibly designed to facilitate the landing of tanks, trucks and heavy equipment directly on the coast of Taiwan(which we have discussed here). These innovative and rapidly built ships could revolutionise the way in which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could mount an invasion of the island.

A new generation of amphibious barges

At least five unusual barges are currently under construction at Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI), located in southern China. These ships feature a unique design: a road bridge over 120 metres long, extending from the bow, allowing direct access to coastal roads or solid ground beyond the beaches.

This configuration is reminiscent of the Mulberry Harbours used by the Allies during the Normandy landings in World War II. Like those historical structures, these barges appear to have been designed for one purpose only: to enable the rapid landing of large quantities of military equipment during an amphibious operation. In addition, some of them are equipped with stabilising pylons, which can be lowered to ensure a stable platform even in adverse weather conditions.

What makes these barges different?

These ships are clearly designed with a military purpose. They have open platforms at the stern, allowing other vessels to dock and unload vehicles such as tanks and armoured vehicles. Their size and technical features make them exaggeratedly sophisticated for civil use, raising doubts about their true purpose.

According to Emma Salisbury, maritime power expert at the Council on Geostrategy:

“Any invasion of Taiwan would require a large number of ships to quickly transport personnel and equipment, particularly armoured vehicles. These mobile barges seem particularly suitable for an invasion.”

China’s civil fleet at the service of military strategy

Over the years, China has built a large fleet of dual-use ships, such as roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ferries. These apparently commercial ferries are actually designed with military specifications and can carry heavy vehicles such as tanks. The new barges would complement this fleet, functioning as mobile ports facilitating the rapid unloading of equipment on Taiwan’s coast.

Defence analyst Damien Symon points out that these barges could dock perfectly with Chinese RORO ferries, turning the country’s civilian fleet into a force ready for an invasion.

The implications for Taiwan

Taiwan’s defence strategy is traditionally based on the protection of a limited number of beaches, which are considered suitable for amphibious landings. These areas are heavily fortified and monitored. However, the introduction of these new barges changes the game dramatically. Thanks to their long bridges and ability to operate in difficult coastal conditions, these vessels allow China to target areas that were previously considered unsuitable for landings, such as rocky shores or sandy beaches.

This flexibility significantly expands the PRC’s options, complicating Taiwan’s ability to organise an effective defence. Instead of relying on Taiwanese ports, China could bring mobile ports directly across the Strait, bypassing traditional access points.

Sign of invasion or mere intimidation?

Although some may argue that these barges have a civil purpose, their scale, speed of construction and specific design suggest otherwise. China is known to exploit the ambiguity of its dual-use infrastructure, and these barges fit perfectly into this strategy.

Dr Salisbury explains:

“As preparation for an invasion, or at least to keep this option open as leverage, I would expect an increase in the construction of ships capable of this type of transport. These barges represent a clear step in that direction.”

Strategic implications

For Taiwan and its allies, these developments are an urgent reminder of the need to prepare for increasingly plausible aggression. They will probably have to review their strategies, strengthening Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, such as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, and increasing surveillance of Chinese shipyards.

Whether these barges are a signal of an imminent invasion or simply part of a broader strategy of pressure and intimidation, one thing is clear: China is building the tools to keep every option on the table. For Taiwan and its allies, vigilance and proactive defensive measures are no longer an option, but a necessity.