The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have played a visible diplomatic role in the Russia-Ukraine war. Saudi Arabia’s hosting of the high-profile US-Russia talks on 18 February 2025 — the first since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and the UAE’s simultaneous reception of Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, mirrored their careful balancing act as they seek to navigate relations with Kyiv, Moscow, Ankara, Tehran and the West while pursuing their strategic interests. The GCC’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war is underpinned by humanitarian concerns, as well as geopolitical, economic, food security and energy interests. GCC countries’ mediation helps boost their influence, positioning them as key powerbrokers amid global polarisation.

Ukraine’s geographic location, natural resources and key role as a trade and energy corridor render it a strategic focal-point in the broader Russia-West power struggle. The outcome of the Ukraine war will not only shape European security but also impact regional security in the wider Middle East, affecting the power balance among the GCC countries, Turkey, Iran, the US and Russia. Moscow remains an important energy partner, while the West serves as a security guarantor for the GCC. At the same time, the Gulf countries use their diplomatic position to check Russian influence, particularly in the energy sector and its deepening ties with Tehran. The weakening of the Iranian regime and its proxies, along with the fall of the Iran-Russia-backed Assad regime in Syria, disrupted the regional strategies of bothMoscow and Tehran, limiting their projection capabilities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 

The role of Turkey

Turkey, which controls access between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas, a key maritime gateway between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, also stands to gain from a favourable outcome in Ukraine. While Ankara has been a key GCC ally against Iran in recent years, its expanding regional footprint, especially in Syria, could challenge the Gulf’s strategic objectives. A new Middle East order may emerge, shaped by a GCC-Türkiye division of spheres of influence, potentially strengthening the interconnection between the Black Sea-Middle East security architecture throughgreater strategic alignment or exacerbating regional rivalries. As a major agricultural producer, Ukraine also plays a role in Middle Eastern food security and therefore also stability. Since the Assad regime’s fall, Kyiv has stepped in to replace Russian wheat exports to Syria and has explored strategic partnerships with Damascus. The Ukrainian battlefield also serves as a valuable laboratory for the future of warfare and the GCC’s defence strategies given the involvement of Iranian military equipment — especially drones — and the importance of cyber capabilities. Increased Ukraine-Middle East engagement may strengthen Europe’s influence in the region over the long term, particularly as Kyiv’s potential European Union (EU) membership could forgenew economic and strategic ties between the two regions.

The GCC engagement

While there is no unified GCC strategy on Ukraine, the GCC countries have, to various degrees, engaged in mitigating the humanitarian, economic, security and diplomatic impact of the war. This included providing aid, facilitating high-level visits, hosting international peace meetings, negotiating prisoner of war (POW) exchanges, and supporting UN resolutions condemning Russia’s actions, while avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow. The Gulf’s stance on the Ukraine conflict has been also informed by past experiences, including the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Western intervention in the Middle East, highlighting their preference for strategic pragmatism. Throughout 2022 and 2023, the GCC countries voted in favour of several United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions, calling for Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine and reaffirming UN Charter principles (March 2022 and February 2023). They also voted to condemn Moscow’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions (October 2022). However, they abstained from the vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council (April 2022).

The GCC countries have maintained high-level engagement with both Kyiv and Moscow, reflecting their pragmatic approach and efforts to position themselves as neutral brokers. Since 2022, the Ukrainian President has been in contact with all GCC leaders and has travelled to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on multiple occasions. By August 2023, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, UAE and Qatar sent Foreign Ministers or other senior officials to Kyiv. Saudi Arabia emerged as a key mediator, inviting Zelenskyy to the May 2023 Arab League Summit, where, alongside a Crimean Tatar leader, he urged Arab states to reconsider ties with Russia. Riyadh also participated in the international summit — without Russia and China — in Denmark in June 2023, and hosted its expanded version with 40 countries, including non-aligned ones such as China and India — though without Russia — in Jeddah in August 2023, highlighting Riyadh’s diplomatic influence. In June 2024, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE participated in the Summit on Peace in Ukraine in Switzerland, although the two latter did not endorse the event’s final communique. Meanwhile, diplomatic activity continued with Russia — Qatari Emir and UAE President met with Russian President in October 2022, who then visited Saudi Arabia and the UAE in December 2023, Bahrain’s King met Putin in Moscow after the 33rd Arab Summit in May 2024, while Foreign Minister Lavrov attended the 7th Strategic Dialogue with GCC counterparts in Riyadh in September 2024. Most recently, in February 2025, the UAE hosted Zelenskyy after talks with Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister.

Although the Gulf countries have faced criticism from the US and Europe for not fully aligning with the West, refusing to join sanctions against Russia, and maintaining trade and energy ties with Moscow, their diplomatic and humanitarian efforts have helped ease Western pressure to choose sides between Russia and Ukraine. Since 2022, the GCC countries engaged in diplomatic efforts to facilitate the exchange of POWs and children repatriation. Saudi Arabia and Türkiye mediated a high-profile POW exchange, including 7 Europeans and 2 Americans, in September 2022. The UAE, so far, negotiated 12 rounds of POW exchanges between Russia and Ukraine that led to the release of nearly 3,000 people. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh also jointly mediated a US-Russia exchange of 2 prisoners in December 2022. Qatar has focused on the particularly sensitive issue of repatriating Ukrainian children from Russia. The GCC countries have also contributed hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian aid to Ukraine throughout the war, with major contributions from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE leading in financial assistance.

GCC’s role in Ukraine’s post-war recovery

This diplomatic and humanitarian engagement is complemented by strengthening economic ties, positioning the GCC countries as potential partners in Ukraine’s post-war recovery. Investment opportunities span Ukraine’s energy, agriculture, infrastructure, logistics, technological and digital sectors. Saudi Arabia’s $400 million aid package included $300 million for Ukraine’s oil derivatives, and the Saudi Public Investment Fund subsidiary, SALIC, recently acquired a stake in MHP, one of Ukraine’s largest agricultural holdings. Ukraine’s Economy Minister, Yulia Svyrydenko, recently led a delegation to Saudi Arabia to discuss investment opportunities in key areas with Saudi business leaders. The UAE went a step further by signing a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) during President Zelenskyy’s recent visit to Abu Dhabi, aiming to deepen bilateral trade and investment cooperation. Strategic investments in Ukraine’s maritime transport infrastructure also hold ample potential. Already before the Russian invasion, Qatar’s terminal operator, QTerminals, had acquired Olvia Port in the Mykolaiv region on the Black Sea. Recognising Ukraine’s importance for regional food security as a leading grain exporter, the GCC countries are also exploring partnerships to expand Ukrainian food supplies to the Middle East and Africa, particularly through the Grain from Ukraine programme. Beyond financial support, the GCC offers a strategic trade and logistics link between Asia, Africa, and Europe. In this context, the October 2024 opening of Ukraine’s embassy in Oman—seen as a potential hub for exporting Ukrainian agricultural products to East Africa—aligns with Kyiv’s efforts to strengthen ties with non-Western countries.

A global power broker

The GCC countries’ growing diplomatic and economic weight has positioned them as key geopolitical players. Their careful navigation of the Russia-Ukraine war underscores a strategic balancing act—leveraging mediation to secure economic and political interests while avoiding full alignment with either side. As the US and Europe increasingly turn to the GCC for diplomatic solutions, the Gulf’s role as a global power broker is more evident than ever. In a world where alliances shift but strategic interests remain constant, the Gulf’s pragmatic diplomacy aims to  ensure regional stability and extend its influence well beyond the Middle East.